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Abstract 
 
For the past few years, oceans have become once again, an important means of 
communication and transport. In fact, traffic density throughout the globe has suffered a 
substantial growth, which has risen some concerns. With this expansion, the need to 
achieve a high Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) is imperative. At the present time, 
this need may be more easily fulfilled thanks to the vast amount of data available 
regarding maritime traffic. However, this brings in another issue: data overload. 
Currently, there are so many data sources, so many data to obtain information from, that 
the operators cannot handle it. There is a pressing need for systems that help to sift 
through all the data, analysing and correlating, helping in this way the decision making 
process.   
In this dissertation, the main goal is to use different sources of data in order to 
detect anomalies and contribute to a clear Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP). In order 
to do so, it is necessary to know what types of data exist and which ones are available 
for further analysis. The data chosen for this dissertation was Automatic Identification 
System (AIS) and Monitorização Contínua das Atividades da Pesca (MONICAP) data, 
also known as Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) data. In order to store 1 year worth of 
AIS and MONICAP data, a PostgreSQL database was created. To analyse and draw 
conclusions from the data, a data mining tool was used, namely, Orange. Tests were 
conducted in order to assess the correlation between data sources and find anomalies.  
The importance of data correlation has never been so important and with this 
dissertation the aim is to show that there is a simple and effective way to get answers 
from great amounts of data.  
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Resumo 
 
Nos últimos anos, os oceanos tornaram-se, mais uma vez, um importante meio 
de comunicação e transporte. De facto, a densidade de tráfego global sofreu um 
crescimento substancial, o que levantou algumas preocupações. Com esta expansão, 
a necessidade de atingir um elevado Conhecimento Situacional Marítimo (CSM) é 
imperativa. Hoje em dia, esta necessidade pode ser satisfeita mais facilmente graças à 
vasta quantidade de dados disponíveis de tráfego marítimo. No entanto, isso leva a outra 
questão: sobrecarga de dados. Atualmente existem tantas fontes de dados, tantos 
dados dos quais extrair informação, que os operadores não conseguem acompanhar. 
Existe uma necessidade premente para sistemas que ajudem a escrutinar todos os 
dados, analisando e correlacionando, contribuindo desta maneira ao processo de 
tomada de decisão.  
Nesta dissertação, o principal objetivo é usar diferentes fontes de dados para 
detetar anomalias e contribuir para uma clara Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP). Para 
tal, é necessário saber que tipos de dados existem e quais é que se encontram 
disponíveis para análise posterior. Os dados escolhidos para esta dissertação foram 
dados Automatic Identification System (AIS) e dados de Monitorização Contínua das 
Atividades da Pesca (MONICAP), também conhecidos como dados de Vessel 
Monitoring System (VMS). De forma a armazenar dados correspondentes a um ano de 
AIS e MONICAP, foi criada uma base de dados em PostgreSQL. Para analisar e retirar 
conclusões, foi utilizada uma ferramenta de data mining, nomeadamente, o Orange. De 
modo a que pudesse ser avaliada a correlação entre fontes de dados e serem detetadas 
anomalias foram realizados vários testes. 
A correlação de dados nunca foi tão importante e pretende-se com esta 
dissertação mostrar que existe uma forma simples e eficaz de obter respostas de 
grandes quantidades de dados. 
 
 
 
 
Palavras-chave: conhecimento situacional marítimo, dados, tráfego marítimo, AIS, 
MONICAP.  
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1. Introduction 
In the last decade, oceans have regained an unparalleled importance to all 
nations, mainly due to the financial influence they represent for each country, especially 
for those that are considered coastal States, with large sea borders. 
Nowadays, oceans are used by almost every country as an effective and cost 
efficient way to commerce goods. In fact, maritime traffic has increased significantly, 
being considered the main route of global trade. 
The United Nations refer that “the world shipping fleet provides not only transport 
connectivity to global trade but also livelihoods to the people working in maritime 
businesses in developed and developing countries” (United Nations, 2017). In fact, if the 
values at the beginning of 2017 are to be considered “the world fleet’s commercial value 
amounted to $829 billion, with different countries benefiting from the building, owning, 
flagging, operation and scrapping of ships” and “with over 80 per cent of global trade by 
volume and more than 70 per cent of its value being carried on board ships and handled 
by seaports worldwide, the importance of maritime transport for trade and development 
cannot be overemphasized” (United Nations, 2017). 
Accordingly, the growth in sea transport has consequently resulted in the 
intensification of traffic density. This brings new issues regarding the navigation and 
maritime transport at safety and security levels (Sulemane, 2015). 
More specifically, Portugal, a coastal State with 92.226,0 km2 (Pordata, 2016), 
located on the South West Europe, has a vast maritime area under its domain. As 
observed in Figures 1 and 2, it is easy to conclude the vast commercial routes and 
immeasurable amount of ships that cross the Portuguese jurisdictional waters.  
According to Autoridade da Mobilidade e dos Transportes (AMT)1, cargo trade at 
the Portuguese mainland ports grew 5.1% by the end of October 2017 to a record of 81.3 
million tonnes. Lisbon stands out, with a year-on-year gain of 26% for the best record in 
the last nine years. By trading 10.3 million tonnes, the port of the capital alone contributed 
with 2.1 million tonnes to the increase in activity on the mainland (Transportes e 
Negócios, 2017). 
                                               
1 Transports and Mobility Authority. It is the regulatory and oversight body for the transport sector in 
Portugal. 
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Figure 1 - Main international maritime routes (Jornal da Economia do Mar, n.d.). 
  
 
Figure 2 - Real time maritime traffic (Marine Traffic, n.d.).  
In addition to trade, there are also other resources in national waters, likewise 
important, which are of considerable value and need to be protected and preserved. 
Therefore, it is clear the need to ensure the proper use of the sea, preventing its illegal 
exploitation by defending its interests, encouraging the overall stability. It is crucial to 
have an adequate monitoring of national waters, to guarantee safety and security. 
Portugal is located in a privileged position, not only in terms of international 
maritime traffic for being near focal points of maritime traffic, but also because of its 
responsibility in the area of Search and Rescue (SAR). With its archipelagos located in 
the North Atlantic, this State is responsible for a SAR area almost 63 times bigger than 
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the country itself, with 5.754.848 km2 (Direção-Geral de Recursos Naturais, Segurança 
e Serviços Marítimos, n.d.).  
In Portugal, it is the Portuguese Navy that has the responsibility of ensuring that 
the country can use the sea for its own interests. Like other navies throughout the world, 
it is based on a dual concept structure. Considering this structure, on the one hand, they 
use their ships and means to perform in actions of military defence and in support of 
foreign policies. On the other hand, they use them to perform in actions concerning the 
authority and security of the country as well as to support the development of various 
areas such as scientific and cultural, thus allowing the maximization of resources. In 
other words, by carrying out missions of military and non-military nature. 
That is why the Portuguese Navy, together with Polícia Judiciária (PJ)2  and 
Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras (SEF)3, plays a big part in the fight against illegal 
maritime activities. From these illegal activities, the following stand out: terrorism (in 
Europe and possibly, in the near future, against the shipping lines essential for the world 
economy), illegal immigration and human trafficking (mostly from the North of Africa to 
Europe), piracy (for example near Guinea Gulf), drug trafficking (such as cocaine and 
haxixe), illegal fishing and depletion of natural resources, among other more (Melo, 
2011). 
Due to its geographical position, Portugal is in the centre of the scene of multiple 
illicit activities of transnational networks. Illegal activities are inextricably linked to trade 
by sea. 
Some of these illicit activities, like drugs and weapons traffic, can be very difficult 
to detect. There is no specificity in the type of ship that carries them, so in order to detect 
them, in an appropriate amount of time, cross-agency collaboration is paramount. 
On the other hand, illicit activities such as illegal fishing and unauthorised 
scientific research can be more easily controlled, by being specialised vessels. However, 
that is not an absolute truth because, depending on the size of the fishing vessels, they 
may or may not have to report their position, in addition to the fact that they are not as 
straightforwardly detected by coastal sensors. 
                                               
2 Judiciary Police. 
3 Immigration and Borders Services. 
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Both the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) are counting on Portugal means to prevent and, if need be, deter any activity 
that could jeopardize the safety and security of ships passing through this large area of 
maritime responsibility. This is not an easy task as more threats assume a diffuse 
feature, not easily recognisable and requiring more of the surveillance systems and their 
operators. 
Two different perspectives can be adopted concerning threats at sea. The first, 
maritime safety, has as a main goal to guarantee the safety of navigation and of those 
who are at sea, by preventing maritime accidents and, if not possible, deal with the 
outcome and the consequences that may arise from those accidents. It also has the goal 
of protecting the maritime environment and its sustainability by preventing the 
exploitation of resources and pollution. The second, maritime security, aims to combat 
illegal actions at sea (Sousa, 2013). This kind of threats are much more complex, 
because they depend on third parties seeking to exploit the vulnerabilities of coastal 
states, in covert actions. 
Taking into consideration the sea’s economy growth, there is the need to create 
a system that has the capacity to integrate all the information coming from different 
sources. 
The integration of all these sources of information will certainly allow to improve 
and increase maritime situational knowledge, contributing to a more conscious action 
throughout the decision cycle, making good use of time and financial resources. 
By belonging to the National Emergency Service network, Maritime Rescue 
Coordination Centre (MRCC) allows the Portuguese Navy to give a quick and specialized 
response to emergency and rescue situations in its area of responsibility. 
Centro de Operações Marítimas (COMAR) 4 , however, is the focal point for 
command and control of all the activity carried out by the Navy, having to be in constant 
coordination with all entities with responsibilities in marine areas under sovereignty, 
jurisdiction or national responsibility (Marinha, 2018).  
COMAR “has an interagency and interdepartmental approach” (Marinha, 2018), 
not only on a national level (the Portuguese Navy, National Maritime Authority, 
Portuguese Air Force, SEF and PJ, among others) but also on an international level, 
                                               
4 Maritime Operations Centre. 
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where several information networks coexist in order to improve the coordinated efforts 
of the different state departments, on their areas of jurisdiction and national 
responsibility. These networks include military and non-military information.  
The fact that MRCC and COMAR occupy the same building is a substantial 
practical advantage. It allows access to different systems, therefore improving Maritime 
Situational Awareness (MSA), thus helping to monitor activities at sea.   
When it comes to COMAR’s role in in the military defence functions and support 
of the State's foreign policy, it maintains a permanent monitoring on the missions of 
Forças Nacionais Destacadas (FND)5, such as those missions under the guidance of the 
European Union and NATO in the fight against piracy in Somalia or NATO counter-
terrorism missions in the Mediterranean (Marinha, 2018). 
COMAR also maintains a continuous monitoring on all Navy’s vessels with 
assigned mission in national waters as well as on the means of the National Maritime 
Authority. It acts as a pillar in the management of Navy’s operational information. In order 
to do this, it relies on the Centro de Análise de Dados Operacionais (CADOP)6.  
For this dissertation, it is also important to distinguish two almost interchangeable 
concepts such as surveillance and monitoring.  
Maritime surveillance can be understood as the systematic observation of 
maritime areas by all means available, with the goal of controlling the movement of 
vessels or other vehicles, operating on the surface or sub-surface of the seas and 
oceans. The ability to continuously cover large areas, with features like accuracy, data 
discrimination and confidence describe what surveillance is all about. 
Monitoring, on the other hand, can be distinguished from surveillance considering 
its main goal. The aim is to maintain and improve standard and safety procedures in 
order to have a better understanding of the environment by using actions belonging to 
surveillance, with this knowledge being continuously improved over time (Carolas, 2016). 
The monitoring therefore consists in controlling one or more parameters in order 
to detect anomalies. 
                                               
5 National Abroad Forces. 
6 Operational Data Analysis and Management Centre. 
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1.1. Motivation 
Each coastal state recognises the importance of the sea resources and the 
importance to take all measures so that what is his remains his, defending their rights in 
what concerns exploitation and exclusivity. Therefore sea presence is fundamental, and 
due to the vastness of maritime areas under Portuguese sovereignty or jurisdiction, that 
may not always be an easy task, opening the opportunity for thirds parties to use 
resources that do not belong to them. In order to ensure that laws and regulations are 
enforced, coastal states should bet on improving the surveillance on their areas. 
As a matter of fact, most of the activities taking place in Portugal’s maritime area 
are not a direct, but a transitory threat. Nonetheless, it is important to avoid the absence 
of authority at sea, taking a special care to not disregard any surveillance measures. It 
is by maintaining a high level of maritime situational awareness, that Portugal can 
counteract any attempts of illicit activities, always being one step ahead.  
1.2. Topic’s relevance 
The biggest problem regarding all the available data is the difficulty to transform 
data in information and then putting into practice all the acquired knowledge. There is so 
much data available that it is difficult to discern what is important and what can be put in 
second plan. It is when connections between data sets are analysed or context is 
introduced that some insight is usually gained, as it is represented in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 - Data, information, knowledge and wisdom (context vs understanding) (Marinha, 2018). 
The need to integrate tools that merge data from different sources and compile 
them into a single system is increasingly evident. At a time when illicit trafficking in the 
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sea surpasses values never seen before and illegal migration is a harsh reality, there is 
a pressing need to introduce means to help the decision making of who is on the ground 
seeking guidance.  
At the level of the Portuguese Navy, as an end-user, this subject gains particular 
prominence. Having access to a software that could respond to the diversity of 
challenges that the naval units come cross would be an added value.  
1.3. Goals 
In this dissertation, the main goal is to answer the following question: 
 How to maximize the achievement of Maritime Situational Awareness by 
detecting anomalies using different sources of data?  
However, in order to do so, it is important to gain some insight on the area and answer 
some questions derived from the above, such as: 
 What is Maritime Situational Awareness and what is the current state of it in 
Portugal? 
 What data sources contribute to a good Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP)? 
And which ones are available? 
 How can the data be used to detect anomalies in the maritime traffic? 
1.4. Structure 
The following dissertation is divided into 6 chapters, including introduction and 
conclusion. Chapter 2 consists of a literature review, where concepts as Maritime 
Situational Awareness, anomaly and anomaly detection will be addressed as well as a 
brief explanation will be presented on some data mining tools. Chapter 3 will consist on 
a description of the methodology and all the processes the data underwent since its 
collection to the moment they were inserted in PostgreSQL database. Chapter 4 will 
describe the scope of the study area as well as all the techniques used in the data 
analysis. Chapter 5 will present all the tests conducted and the respective results. The 
conclusion, will summarize what were the results, the difficulties felt and future projects 
that could be taken into consideration.  
In order to protect data confidentiality, all information regarding vessel’s identity 
was modified. Any resemblance to reality is purely coincidental.  
The referencing style present throughout this dissertation is American 
Psychological Association (APA). 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1. Maritime Situational Awareness 
Maritime Situational Awareness is a very important concept and must be fully 
understood. The first thing that must be comprehended is that MSA’s concept is not a 
static one (Pereira, 2010) and more often than not it does not result from the input of one 
single system but from the combination of several working together. To some authors, 
MSA is “the capability of understanding events, circumstances and activities within and 
impacting the maritime environment” (Arguedas, 2015). Other definitions go even further 
and say that MSA should facilitate the process of decision making and permit an effective 
operational response (Estado Maior da Armada, 2012).   
The concept of Maritime Situational Awareness appeared based on an already 
existing concept, Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), following a NATO summit in Riga, 
2006. In May 2008, it was presented by NATO a MSA Concept Development Plan with 
the main purpose of implementing a MSA with a Doctrine, Organization, Training, 
Logistic, Leadership, Personnel, Infrastructures and Interoperability (DOTMLPII) 
approach (Veloso, 2015).  
  MSA seeks to obtain, as a final result, a fully clarified surface picture, receiving 
to that end the contributions of several surveillance and monitoring systems as well as 
knowledge generated by other sources. If data is able to cover “all aspects of a situation 
of interest in a timely manner, one can then say that complete and continuous situational 
awareness has been achieved” (Martineau, 2011). However, it is important to understand 
that total situational awareness “would be akin to omniscience and achieving it would be 
a utopia” (Martineau, 2011). 
In order to produce knowledge regarding the maritime domain by identification of 
patterns of the maritime community, reliable and continuous data must be collected from 
all kinds of data sources.  
Therefore, the creation of safety applications that are capable of detecting 
behavioural patterns of ships and anomalies that indicate potential situations of infraction 
is not only feasible but of utmost importance. These applications might help the security 
forces clarifying the maritime picture. Only then will it be possible to take action in a timely 
manner, maximizing the use of resources and minimizing risks (Estado Maior da 
Armada, 2012). The goal is to have automation in the generation of alerts in order to 
trigger the corresponding actions. 
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In today’s world, the prime challenge of MSA is the “aggregation of large amounts 
of heterogeneous data and their transformation into useful and reliable information to 
support users in the decision making process” (Arguedas, 2015). From the analysis of a 
large volume and variety of data with spatial and geographic representation, using 
techniques that can detect connections between events, it is possible to provide 
mechanisms to draw certain conclusions (Arguedas, 2015). 
In fact, there are so many sources of data nowadays that the issue now is not the 
lack of data but the overwhelming amount of it. Therefore, there have been developed 
several automation processes in order to deal with that amount of data. It is even 
considered that “to manually pore through and to analyse the information in a bid to 
identify potential maritime threat is tedious, if at all possible” (Chen, 2013). 
The ability to extract knowledge that is useful, but is usually hidden, from data is 
becoming more and more important in the 21st century (Ahlemeyer, 2014). On a 
computational level, the industry has suffered numerous technological advances, in both 
the hardware and software sectors, being able to store, process and analyse a large 
amount of data with an increasingly ease. 
2.1.1. NATO’s role 
NATO developed several systems that contribute to MSA. Baseline for Rapid 
Iterative Transformational Experimentation (BRITE) was developed as “part of the 
initiative Technology for Information, Decision and Execution (TIDE) superiority”. It is a 
“National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) program of record that provides a client-
server system for image dissemination” (North American Job Bank International 
Networking, n.d.). 
Maritime Safety and Security Information System (MSSIS) is another one of these 
systems. It is “a freely-shared, unclassified, near real-time data collection and distribution 
network” (Maritime Safety and Security Information System, 2008). It collects Automatic 
Identification System (AIS) data from ships from member countries and broadcasts them 
almost in real time (Veloso, 2015). Its main goal is to increase maritime security and 
safety by promoting a “multilateral collaboration and data-sharing among international 
participants” (Maritime Safety and Security Information System, 2008). This allows to 
have a RMP at a very low cost.   
Maritime Command and Control Information System (MCCIS) also contributes to 
MSA, by providing as well “a high quality RMP” (Maritime Safety and Security Information 
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System, 2008) and giving inputs to NATO’s Common Operational Picture (COP). MCCIS 
has appeared “as the C2 (Command and Control) tool of choice for NATO’s maritime 
component commanders” (Germain, 1997). 
Another one of these systems is Fast Connectivity for Coalition Agents Program 
(FastC2AP). FastC2AP is a “human-interactive, rule-based program” which focus on 
helping operators in specifying “vessel behaviours and characteristics that drive alerts 
and prompt operators to analyse those vessels further” (National Research Council, 
2008).  
Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIX) is an 
“operational level network, supporting regional commanders and their staffs at a variety 
of security levels” (Mitchell, 2013) which allows the exchange of a Common Operational 
Picture, e-mails with attachments, web-enabled services, chat and Voice over Internet 
Protocol (VoIP). 
Networked Interoperable Real-Time Information Services (NIRIS) is a system 
that “displays real time maritime, ground, air tactical and theatre missile defence data 
received from control reporting centres” (Kowalczyk, 2009). It contributes by 
transforming data into interoperable information, based on NATO and commercial 
standards, by offering a package of services that allow data compilation and 
dissemination (Veloso, 2015). 
2.1.2. Europe’s role 
In 2008, a new project was embraced by European Union, being supported by 
the Council and European Parliament. Common Information Sharing Environment 
(CISE) was developed in order to establish itself as a system of information sharing, with 
the main purpose of expanding each country’s maritime surveillance.  It was supported 
by the countries’ need to ensure safety and protection of the seas and oceans (Veloso, 
2015).  
The end result intended for CISE is to turn maritime surveillance the most 
accessible and coherent as possible between all individuals, not exactly to collect data. 
This would be accomplished by having automatic data sharing mechanisms that would 
allow access to relevant information in real time.  
Therefore, several projects emerged in order to attain this goal.  
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Maritime Surveillance in the Northern Sea Basins (MARSUNO), was created with 
the purpose of supporting CISE, overcoming legal, technical and administrative 
obstacles (Veloso, 2015) in what concerns the sharing of information beyond borders. It 
counted with the participation of 9 countries throughout 24 months: Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland and Sweden as the central partner.  
BlueMassMed (BMM), on its turn, was created with the intent of “increasing the 
interoperability between the existing control and location systems” and “evaluate the 
project’s partners capability of sharing surveillance information” in the areas where they 
intervene.  It was supported financially by the European Commission and by Portugal, 
Spain, Italy, France, Greece and Malt (Instituto Hidrográfico, n.d.), and intended to centre 
its efforts on monitoring the maritime situation in the Mediterranean and Atlantic 
approaches, establishing the prototype on which collaboration should be expanded at 
European level (Pereira, 2010). 
In order to developed CISE’s security component, other 7 initiatives were 
financed by EU, namely, European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), Protection 
of European seas and borders through the intelligent use of surveillance (PERSEUS), 
Integrated System for Interoperable sensors & Information sources for Common 
abnormal vessel behaviour detection & Collaborative identification of threat (I2C), Sea 
Border Surveillance (SEABILLA), Dolphin, New Services Capabilities for Integrated and 
Advanced Maritime Surveillance (NEREIDS) and Simulator for Moving Target Indicator 
System (SIMTISYS) (Veloso, 2015). 
In the Portuguese Navy, the document that regulates the definition of Maritime 
Situational Awareness is IOA 114 – Conceito de Conhecimento Situacional Marítimo7. It 
was developed to be used in support of decision making regarding maritime operations 
(Estado Maior da Armada, 2012). In an ever changing environment such as the sea, 
subject to multiple threats and security issues, being able to have the upper hand is key. 
In order for that to happen, it is essential to continuously monitor the maritime 
environment so that superiority of information (Estado Maior da Armada, 2012) is 
attained and can be used to protect the security and the state’s authority.  This superiority 
can be achieved by obtaining relevant data, processing it and creating connections 
between the different types of data and therefore turn data into information. This 
superiority is only possible if there is confidence and integrity regarding the information 
                                               
7 IOA 114 – Concept of Maritime Situational Awareness. 
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received. So information, on a military level, is shared on a need to know basis. Access 
restrictions are justifiable, however it poses as “a major problem in the domain of 
anomaly detection” (Martineau, 2011).  
The management of the sea is not an easy feat considering how many national 
and international entities are involved, sharing responsibilities, dependencies and lines 
of authority.  Each one has their own goals and concerns, using different systems to 
store, analyse, fuse, validate and share data (Estado Maior da Armada, 2012). Data 
sharing, or its lack thereof, is one of the main obstacles in the search of maritime 
situational awareness. It is through data that one gains information and now, 21st century, 
more than ever, information is a tool that grants power. That is why data sharing has 
usually several deterring policies. This causes big discrepancies between the several 
systems that help to achieve MSA. The amount and disparity of data (often not 
interoperable) and information generated concerning the maritime domain is often a 
hindrance, making it hard to coordinate and use on an operational level.  
The construction of a robust MSA capability faces different challenges that need 
to be overcome. As it is shown on Figure 4, these challenges can be of 4 different kinds 
(Estado Maior da Armada, 2012).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On a technical level, it is difficult to have a predefined architecture and ensure 
interoperability between the several systems. On a geographical point of view, the 
amount of sensors and systems required depend on the size and location of the area. 
On an organizational standpoint, it is important to have an agile structure that 
allows responding to the different levels of performance in the maritime domain (Estado 
Maior da Armada, 2012). From a legal perspective, what immediately stands out, as 
MSA 
Challenges
Technical Geographical Organizational Legal
Figure 4 - Challenges of Maritime Situational Awareness 
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mentioned before, is the data sharing policies, because each organization or agency has 
its own directives, concerning data distribution, that must be followed. 
Although there is often certain interferences concerning information sharing and 
exchange, it is extremely advantageous. Firstly, it grants access to data that would not 
be possible to access by own means. Secondly and lastly, because it allows to save up 
resources and avoid unnecessary work and effort. In this way, it is not technical matters 
that pose so much of a problem but the policies for data sharing. 
Generating MSA involves 5 different steps: acquisition, fusion and analysis, 
diffusion and archive (Estado Maior da Armada, 2012). 
Having an archive where all the data is stored is of particular relevance 
considering new algorithms and methods can be applied to that data and tested, in order 
to generate automatic alarms that can help the operator. This is especially important 
considering that “human(s) are always in the loop. Systems are made to improve the 
performance of operators, not to fully replace them” (Martineau, 2011). 
The Portuguese Navy counts with the support of several information systems, 
such as Oversee. Oversee is a software developed by the company Critical Software 
and is considered to be a “system of systems” (Estado Maior da Armada, 2017) because 
it integrates information from several systems and shows it in a user-friendly manner. It 
was first intended to assist SAR activities, however, because it has access to classified 
databases and systems, such as NATO MCCIS, it can be used on an operational level, 
aiding to increase MSA. 
It essentially receives and allows the visualization of Global Maritime Distress and 
Safety System (GMDSS) 8  alerts. However, it also allows the integration of others 
sources of information. Systems like AIS, Satellite – Automatic Identification System 
(SAT-AIS), Vessel Monitoring System (VMS), also known as Monitorização Contínua 
das Atividades da Pesca (MONICAP)9 (European Economic Community, 1993), Long 
Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) system, among others, can be inserted in 
Oversee. 
                                               
8 GMDSS is an international system that through satellite technology and radio communication equipment 
aims to provide automated communication for ships in distress. 
9 Fishing Activities Continuous Monitoring. 
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Currently, there are several projects that aim to improve MSA. The most recent 
one, is Maritime Integrated Surveillance Awareness (MARISA). It has, as one of the main 
goals, the fusion of heterogeneous data and information, creating a toolkit that allows an 
effective information sharing, the identification of possible risk situations and assist the 
process of decision making. It counts with the participation of 22 partners located in 9 
European countries. Portugal assures its participation with Inovaworks (a national 
technological company), INESC-INOV (a development entity) and through the 
Portuguese Navy with Centro de Investigação Naval (CINAV)10. It was through CINAV 
that this dissertation topic was suggested in order to contribute, if possible, to MARISA 
project.  
2.2. Maritime Domain Data 
In general, data can have two origins: NATO systems or external commercial 
sources. Before going through several tools of fusion and analysis in order to produce 
information, it is necessary to compile and share data with other systems with the same 
degree of classification.  
The data acquired on the geographic distribution of vessels can be divided into 
two groups, “self-reporting or observation-based” (Arguedas, 2015) according to the way 
the data is obtained. 
There are several examples of self-reporting data, such as AIS, LRIT and 
VMS/MONICAP, each one of them with different purposes, such as collision avoidance, 
security and safety and fisheries monitoring (Arguedas, 2015).  
Long-Range Identification and Tracking of ships is one of these sources and it 
was established in 2006 as an international system by the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO). LRIT system uses vessels’ satellite communications in order to 
transmit its information, such as position, which is transmitted at least four times a day. 
The European Union Cooperative Data Centre (EU CDC) tracks over 8000 ships per day 
and it aims to disseminate LRIT information on European ships around the world, being 
one of the largest LRIT distribution centres (European Maritime Safety Agency, n.d.). As 
a result, LRIT is one of the data sets used by the European Maritime Safety Agency 
(EMSA) and other organizations interfaces, being of great importance for maritime safety 
and awareness. AIS and MONICAP will be discussed later on, considering that, in spite 
                                               
10 Portuguese Naval Research Centre. 
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of all these data sources, they are the ones that will be further analysed throughout this 
dissertation. 
EMSA was developed in 2002 and it aims to decrease the risk of “maritime 
accidents, maritime pollution from ships and to prevent the loss of human life during the 
navigation” (Dorel, 2013). This is achieved with the creation of legislation, introducing 
measures regarding maritime safety and defence, which are generated in accordance 
with the already existing rules of the member states. EMSA is also responsible for 
providing information, upon request, to competent national authorities and European 
Union institutions. One example of this, is the on-going cooperation with COMAR, as 
EMSA provides permanent access to information regarding maritime awareness. 
Therefore, the collection of big sets of data is a must in order to maintain a constant 
monitoring of the seas. 
Observation-based data, on its turn, is collected by passive or active sensors. 
Examples of this type of data are Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), space-based Earth 
Observation (EO) (Arguedas, 2015). These sensors’ detection capabilities depend on a 
variety of factors, whether they are of a more technical sort (e.g. resolution) or of an 
environmental nature (e.g. Sea state). 
SAR main advantage is the fact that it benefits from “the long-range propagation 
characteristics of radar signals” (Sandia National Laboratories, n.d.) and the “information 
processing capability of modern digital electronics to provide high resolution imagery” 
(Sandia National Laboratories, n.d.). It is independent of flight altitude (providing a high 
resolution capability), independent of the weather (provided that the proper frequency 
range is selected) and it also has day/night capability due to its own illumination (Moreira, 
2013). 
2.2.1. AIS   
AIS was developed with the main goal of providing itself “as a tool for maritime 
safety – vessel collision avoidance” (Tetreault, 2005), intended to be used by Vessel 
Traffic Services (VTS) in order to track and monitor vessel movements operating near 
their coasts and to assist ships’ watch-keepers. It is expected that AIS, as a VTS tool, 
would “be used in conjunction with traditional VTS sensors and tools” (Tetreault, 2005) 
to assist the VTS watch-stander to have a thorough and broad comprehension of the 
maritime traffic, allowing him to monitor the current situation and offer recommendations 
to mariners.  
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By providing coastal stations with the information required under “mandatory or 
voluntary reporting schemes as well as for VTS purposes”, AIS can help reducing “the 
work of the watch-keeper” (MCANET, n.d.).   
Therefore, AIS is “an international standard for ship-to-ship, ship-to-shore and 
shore-to-ship communication of information” (Tetreault, 2005). It was regulated and 
normalized by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and implemented by 
IMO afterwards. 
All International Requirements for carriage of AIS can be found on Chapter V, 
Regulation 19.2.4 of the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention. This regulation can 
be found in Annex A. 
No matter the area where the ships are operating, across the ocean or near the 
coast, AIS works in an “autonomous and continuous mode” (Navigation Center, n.d.). 
For transmission, only one radio channel is necessary. The radios associated with the 
AIS consist of “1 full-range Very High Frequency (VHF) transmitter, 1 Digital Selective 
Calling (DSC) Ch. 70 receiver (used for frequency management and DSC polling), and 
2 VHF Gaussian Minimum Shift Keying (GMSK) receivers” (Tetreault, 2005). However, 
in order to prevent problems regarding interferences in communication, each station 
transmits, as well as receives, more than 2 radio channels, with the following 
frequencies: “161.975MHz (AIS1) and 162.02MHz (AIS2)” (Melo, 2011) with the added 
possibility of shifting channels without any loss of communication.  
There are two types of AIS, class A and class B. Class B AIS was designed as 
“a more economical, of smaller reach and of limited information transmitted alternative” 
(Melo, 2011). When compared to Class A AIS, it has an inferior reporting frequency. 
AIS diverges from other kind of maritime equipment because it uses a protocol 
called Self-Organizing Time Division Multiple Access (SOTDMA). By not having to rely 
upon receiving any kind of stimulus for broadcasting, it can be set apart from other kind 
of equipment. 
“AIS equipment self-organizes its broadcasts” (Tetreault, 2015) so that there is 
no interference regarding messages between AIS equipment operating in close 
proximity.  
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Each AIS station establishes “its own transmission schedule (slot)” taking into 
consideration “data link traffic history and knowledge of future actions by other stations” 
(Navigation Center, n.d.).  
Every 60 seconds, 2250 time slots are established. As there is two frequencies, 
overall there are “4500 slots per minute available” (Melo, 2011). A simple position report 
regarding one AIS station is included into one of those 2250 slots. Each AIS unit 
automatically “determines what slots are available for its use, broadcasts its intentions 
for slot use to other units to allocate the slots, and transmits its messages” (Tetreault, 
2015). Figure 5 represents this process.  
 
Figure 5 –AIS Functioning – Slots (Navigation Center, n.d.). 
Overlapping of slot transmissions is easily avoided by constant synchronization. 
The selection of each slot is “randomized within a defined interval, and tagged with a 
random timeout of between 0 and 8 frames” (Tetreault, 2015). Before changing its slot 
assignment, each station announces the new location and the respective timeout. 
Regarding coverage, it depends on the height of the antenna, being AIS coverage 
similar to other VHF applications. Compared to radar, AIS has a slightly better 
performance when it comes to propagation. It is not usually affected by the weather, only 
by the “shielding of the transmitted signal by land masses and buildings” (International 
Maritime Organization, n.d.). In spite of this, its wavelength is significantly longer than 
radar, being able to reach around the contour of the land and even in certain 
circumstances behind small islands, if they are not too high.  
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In general, at sea, AIS has a range of 15 to 20 nautical miles. Base stations, on 
its turn, can expand the range up to 40 to 60 miles (Marine Traffic, n.d.), provided that 
aspects as the weather conditions, elevation, antenna type and obstacles surrounding 
the antenna are favourable.  
AIS can broadcast three types of information (Figure 6):  
 Static, which includes the ship’s name, Maritime Mobile Service Identity 
(MMSI)11, ship type, ship size, among others; 
 Dynamic, such as the ship’s location (latitude and longitude), its Rate of Turn 
(ROT), Speed Over Ground (SOG), Course Over Ground (COG); 
 Voyage related data such as vessel destination, cargo nature and Estimated 
Time of Arrival (ETA).  
                                               
11 MMSI is a series of nine digits and its purpose is to uniquely identify stations, whether they are ship 
stations or coast stations. To each ship corresponds a different MMSI. 
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Figure 6 – Example of information given by AIS. 
These types of information are compiled into messages that are autonomously 
broadcast “at a regular time interval” and “can be received by on board transceiver and 
terrestrial and/or satellite base station” (Mao, 2016). Static information, as well as voyage 
related information is broadcast “every 6 minutes” (Tetreault, 2015) or as requested.  On 
its turn, dynamic information is transmitted almost instantaneously, “every 2 to 10 
seconds” increasing to “every 3 minutes” if the vessel is anchored, depending on each 
AIS class. 
There is, however, some technical issues that arise when it comes to deal with 
AIS data.  
Firstly, it is of utmost importance that all the information contained therein must 
be correctly inserted (concerning static and voyage related information) and functioning 
properly (when it comes to dynamic inputs).   
Types of 
information
Static
Ship's name
MMSI
Ship type
Ship size
Dynamic
Location
ROT
SOG
COG
Voyage related
Destination
Cargo nature 
ETA
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Secondly, taking into consideration that there is a vast amount of data available, 
handling it is no easy feat. Making it useful for obtaining Maritime Situational Awareness 
is one of the main goals, but for that to happen several steps must be taken. Data 
validation, data correlation and data fusion are some of those steps. The integration with 
different systems is favourable but is not as straightforward as it may seem. Moreover, 
the storage of such a big volume of data and making it available for being analysed by 
expertise is another challenge that must be faced.  
There are many AIS providers. One of them is Marine cadastre, which has data 
collected by the United States of America (USA) Coast Guard. It contains data from 2009 
to 2014 on United States’ waters. Another one is Sailwx, which contains data related to 
a small portion of the ships worldwide. Only “those that participate in the World 
Meteorological Organization's program of voluntary at-sea weather reporting, and those 
vessels operating AIS transponders within range of a participating shore station” (Sailwx, 
n.d.) are contained in Sailwx database. Another one is Marine Traffic. This last one differs 
from the others by providing historical data at a certain cost, in relation to the volume of 
data requested and the processing desired (Marine Traffic, n.d.).  
The data is delivered in Comma Separated Values (CSV) format and can be from 
terrestrial AIS receivers or Satellite AIS Receivers. As the name indicates, CSV files use 
the comma as a separator for each value in a text file. It can also use tab or semicolon 
to separate values. CSV files have several advantages, such as being a simple file, 
opened by text editors and easily manipulated in a programing level. It also consumes 
less memory than Excel files. 
Although there are many AIS data providers, there is no “standard AIS 
benchmark database in maritime research area” (Mao, 2016). This is a great 
inconvenience considering all the time, effort and money involved to have a usable 
dataset which can be used later on by different researchers. It also gains importance 
considering that there is no way of comparing different methods or algorithms for 
anomaly detection or motion prediction because there is not a unique database to test 
them.  
“The Portuguese Navy has a network of AIS stations” (Soares, 2012). The data 
obtained from those stations is then directed “to a server in the Navy’s private network 
designated AIS server” (Soares, 2012).   
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The AIS server is located in Lisbon, more precisely in Direção de Tecnologias de 
Informação e Comunicações (DITIC) 12 , that is an organ of Superintendência das 
Tecnologias de Informação (STI)13 that assures the exercise of the technical authority in 
the field of Navy’s communication and information systems (Chefe do Estado Maior da 
Armada, 2016). It receives, through Portuguese Navy communications’ infrastructures, 
AIS messages that compiled enable the assessment of the world panorama.  
This raw data, which comes in National Marine Electronics Association (NMEA) 
format, is collected in MATLAB (MATrix LABoratory) files, of the type *.mat, containing 
what corresponds to 10 minutes of raw AIS data and is, later on, compiled in a daily file, 
acknowledged as “F” type file (Melo, 2011), F of footprint. Through Sistema de Apoio à 
Decisão para a Atividade de Patrulha (SADAP)14 it is possible to have access to the files 
compiled in a daily basis. This system will be further analysed in the next section of this 
document.   
As it is represented in Figure 7, each daily file is divided in two sub-matrixes, one 
that contains reports inside the Maritime Operational Area15 (footprint_aom.mat) and 
other that includes reports outside of it (footprint_n_aom.mat) (Melo, 2011). 
                                               
12 DITIC - Directorate of Information and Communication Technologies. 
13 Superintendence of Information Technologies. 
14 SADAP – Activity Patrol Decision Support System. 
15Área Operacional Marítima (AOM). 
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Figure 7 - AIS data, reports inside the Maritime Operational Area. 
2.2.2. MONICAP 
Another data type used in this dissertation is MONICAP. MONICAP or VMS, 
made its first appearance in 1987 (Bhargava, 2012) and is a system which aims to 
monitor the inspection of fishing activities (INOV, n.d.).  
As it is shown in Figure 8, it uses “Global Positioning System (GPS) for the 
location and Inmarsat C for satellite communications between vessels and a ground 
control station” (INOV, n.d.).  
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Figure 8 - MONICAP system's functioning (Direção-Geral de Recursos Naturais, Segurança e Serviços 
Marítimos, n.d.). 
MONICAP is currently “in operation in six countries, monitoring daily thousands 
of vessels” (XSealence, n.d.). According to Portuguese Law Decree 310/98, article 3, 
line b), all ships with an over-all length of 15 meters are required to have this system on 
board, regardless of the place where the vessels are carrying out their activities and the 
fishing gear they possess. 
It is based on “telecommunications technologies and geographic information” and 
it consists of a “continuous monitoring equipment16 installed on fishing vessels, also 
labelled (…) as blue box” (European Economic Community, 1993). Figure 9 represents 
the designated “blue box”. 
                                               
16 Equipamento de Monitorização Contínua (EMC). 
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Figure 9 - Continuous monitoring equipment (XSEALENCE, n.d.).  
It allows monitoring from shore, position and speed of ships on which the 
MONICAP box is installed. As it is shown in Table 1 and Figure 10, the MONICAP system 
sends data in the following format:  
Table 1 – Example of MONICAP data format. 
Vessel name 
Community 
Fleet Register 
(CFR) number  
dd-mm-yy Hh:mm:ss Longitude Latitude COG SOG 
Altair 
PRT 
000022323 
24-01-2017 02:51:00 -27.32461232 62.14296321 089 7.40 
 
Figure 10 - Example of MONICAP messages. 
The “blue box” sends this data “through satellite to a coordinator centre in 
Norway” (Soares, 2012). The data is then distributed to the correspondent country, taking 
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into consideration the country’s maritime jurisdiction when it comes to fishing activities 
(Soares, 2012). In Portugal, the organ responsible for receiving the data is the Ministry 
of the Sea, through Direção-Geral de Recursos Naturais, Segurança e Serviços 
Marítimos (DGRM)17 which in turn sends it to the Portuguese Navy, more specifically 
DITIC. MONICAP data is stored in SADAP information system, which was developed by 
the Portuguese Navy in 2006 (Melo, 2011). SADAP also allows access to “statistics 
regarding fishery inspection activities and access to the latest position of fishing vessels 
operating in the Portuguese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)” (Soares, 2012). Every 2 
hours, the position of all vessels equipped with MONICAP is sent to DITIC through e-
mail.  
Besides allowing the monitoring of the fishing activities, it allows the reception 
and transmission of meteorological data and assists in the control of maritime traffic.  
MONICAP’s biggest advantage is its high reliability. It has several mechanisms 
that guarantee that the box equipment is not violated by presumable transgressors who 
would want to cover up illicit activities. That is what separates MONICAP from AIS data, 
the permeability to external interference. One disadvantage is the way the data is 
received, via e-mail, streaming near real-time would be best. In addition, the field with 
the vessel name can be vague considering that the names can repeat themselves. 
However, with the appearance of the Community Fleet Register number (CFR) that no 
longer poses a problem.  
AIS and VMS are disparate and independent “tracking systems”. Although each 
one of them has its own advantages, by correlating both data sources it is possible to 
accurately build a specific track of a ship and identify its activity. AIS can be used to deal 
with the VMS outages, which is not a rare event, and VMS can help corroborating some 
of the AIS data. The main differences between AIS and VMS are presented in Table 2. 
                                               
17 General Directorate for Natural Resources, Safety and Maritime Services. It results from the fusion of 
Instituto Portuário e dos Transportes Marítimos (IPTM) with Direção-Geral das Pescas e Aquicultura 
(DGPA). 
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Table 2 – AIS and VMS comparison (Navigation Center, n.d.). 
 
2.3. Concept of Anomaly 
Firstly, one must clarify that there is no consensus on the meaning of anomaly. 
From the dictionary, anomaly can be considered a “deviation from the common rule, 
type, arrangement, or form” or even as “an incongruity or inconsistency” being often a 
synonym of “peculiarity” (Dictionary, 2018). The meaning of pattern is also relevant here. 
By definition, “a pattern is composed of recurring events that repeat in a predictable 
manner” (Martineau, 2011). What can be predicted is often considered as “normal” and 
what cannot, is considered as anomalous.  
However, the boundary between what is regarded as normal and abnormal is 
very thin, considering that the prediction of normal behaviours is not an easy task. This 
is especially true when the “anomalies are the result of malicious actions” (Chandola, 
2009), with the goal of masking anomalous observations as normal. It should be kept in 
mind that what is normal is often changing and evolving. 
Two concepts that often are used undistinguishably is abnormality and threat. 
Although usually threats are anomalies, not all anomalies are considered threats. In fact, 
for some, “an anomaly is only a threat in context” (Seibert, 2009).  To be able to classify 
an anomaly, whether or not it poses a threat, is an advantage because it allows to handle 
them in order of priority.  
Several types of anomalies can be considered, falling into the following 
categories: 
 Point anomalies: if a certain data instance stands out from the rest of the data as 
being anomalous then it is considered a point anomaly.  
 Contextual Anomalies (or conditional anomalies): data instances that under a 
certain context gain another dimension and fall out of the ordinary. It is only when 
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the context is introduced that the data may be classified as anomalous, otherwise 
it does not stand out. 
 Collective anomalies: in this type of anomaly an individual data instance on its 
own does not attract attention as an anomaly. However, the occurrence of a 
group of data instances together may be considered as anomalous. Figure 11 
helps to better understand this type of anomaly. It shows the output of a human 
electrocardiogram and the highlighted region represents the anomaly: a low 
value for an abnormally long time (Chandola, 2009). 
 
Figure 11 - Collective Anomaly example (Chandola, 2009). 
2.4. Anomaly Detection 
Although the majority of the systems were developed with the purpose of raising 
situational awareness, they can be used in anomaly detection. Due to the amount of data 
being generated every day, it is necessary to “sift through large quantities of data and 
highlight elements worthy of interest” (Martineau, 2011).  
The problem of anomaly detection can be quantified as a “two class classification 
problem” (Gonzalez, 2002), as normal or abnormal. 
One of the things to be done first is to identify extreme values in the dataset or 
data inconsistencies. An example of this can be an AIS transmitter that stops its 
transmission in an area that supposedly has coverage or AIS records that register 
abnormally high speeds.  
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Data fusion is considered to be the second step in the anomaly detection process 
(Martineau, 2011). This can be of especial importance given the fact that data is not 
always reliable and can be incomplete. Ships’ position is “a classic example of fusion in 
the maritime domain” (Martineau, 2011). There is a multitude of ways of tracking a ship, 
through several sensors. Some imprecise, others that can be forged. The goal is to 
achieve a position as close as possible to reality. When trying to correlate two or more 
data sources, an anomaly can be found if there are big discrepancies between them. 
However, like mentioned before, it is always important to put anomalies into context, 
because sometimes what appears to fall out of the pattern of normality can be easily 
justified, for example by the environmental conditions. A practical example of correlation 
with different sources of data can be observed when NATO ships are conducting military 
operations, such as Operation Sea Guardian. This operation aims to support the 
maritime situational awareness and contribute to maritime security capacity-building, 
among other tasks. 
2.5. Data mining tools 
With the advent of technology, the amount of data stored has continuously 
increased and this tremendous rate of increment tends only to keep growing every day. 
It is said that human knowledge has an exponential curve, doubling roughly every 
century until 1900’s and having a massive growth so far, with expectations that it will 
double every 12 hours in the future (Schilling, 2013).  In this manner, there is an urgent 
need to have mechanisms and tools to assist the human operator extracting the useful 
information from such volumes of data (Fayyad, 1996). It is important to have a suitable 
answer. And that answer lies with data mining.  
First of all it is necessary to define what is data mining and its main goals and its 
applicability. 
Data mining is considered to be “the search for new, valuable, and nontrivial 
information in large volumes of data” (Kantardzic, 2011) or, in other words, data mining 
is “the process of discovering interesting patterns and knowledge from large amounts of 
data” (Han, 2012). While some people consider data mining to be the same as 
“Knowledge Discovery in Databases (KDD)” (Oracle, n.d.), others think that Data Mining 
is just a “step in the process of knowledge discovery” (Han, 2012).  
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This process can be divided into 7 steps (Han, 2012) which are identified in Figure 
12.  
 
Figure 12 - Knowledge discovery process. 
The tasks of data mining can be considered twofold (Shah, 2017). One of them 
is to create “a predictive power using features to predict unknown future values of the 
same or other feature” and the other one is to “create a descriptive power” (Shah, 2017) 
able to find a pattern that describes the data and can be easily perceived by users.  
Data mining uses several different techniques to handle the data. Some of the 
most useful are classification and regression (both predictive tasks) and clustering and 
association rule discovery (of the descriptive kind).  
Nowadays, there are numerous data mining tools which have as a main goal to 
ease the work of any person wanting to analyse big sets of data. Through tools that allow 
to easily gain useful insight of the data and making projections, it is possible to enhance 
the efficiency of the work at hands. These tools have another advantage, it is not 
necessary to implement standard algorithms from scratch, which allows the opportunity 
to test different techniques in a short amount of time. Moreover, if need be, it is also 
possible to change the code of the tool to fit the user’s requirements.    
Presently, RapidMiner, Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis (Weka), R, 
Scikit-learn, Konstanz Information Miner (KNIME), Orange, Knowledge Extraction based 
1 - Data cleaning (removal of inconsistent data);
2 - Data integration (combination of data from multiple sources);
3 - Data selection (selection of relevant data from database);
4 - Data transformation (transformation and consolidation of data to be suitable for 
mining); 
5 - Data mining (process to extract data patterns);
6 - Pattern evaluation (identification of interesting patterns that represent knowledge);
7 - Knowledge presentation (representation and visualization of mined knowledge to users).
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on Evolutionary Learning (KEEL) and Tanagra are some of the existing data mining tools 
used all over the world. 
Three of them were explored and will be discussed further on.  
2.5.1. RapidMiner 
Formerly known as YALE (Yet Another Learning Environment), RapidMiner was 
first developed in 2001 in Java. This tool incorporates several data mining functions, 
such as data pre-processing, visualization, predictive analysis, clustering, among others. 
RapidMiner environment can be observed in Figure 13. All those functionalities 
combined with the advantage of being easily integrated with other data mining tools, like 
WEKA, made it a candidate for further exploring. However, the free version, the 
RapidMiner Studio Free Edition, has the downside of being limited to 1 logical processor 
and 10,000 data rows, which presents itself as a constraint when working with a great 
amount of data.  
 
Figure 13 - Rapid Miner environment. 
2.5.2. WEKA 
Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis was first released in 1997 and was 
written in Java. As main features, it has a comprehensive set of pre-processing tools, 
learning algorithms and evaluation methods, different graphical user interfaces and an 
environment for the comparison of learning algorithms (Rehman, 2009). WEKA 
environment can be observed in Figure 14.  
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Figure 14 - WEKA environment. 
One particularity of Weka is that it only deals with “flat” files18.  
It also allows to choose and launch a specific Weka environment, through the 
Weka GUI (Graphical User Interface) Chooser as it can be seen in Figure 15.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 - Weka GUI Chooser. 
 
                                               
18 Flat files are characterised for being simple data files in text or binary format, from which all word 
processing or other structure characters have been removed. CSV is an example of a flat file. 
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For being a tool used in classes in the Portuguese Naval Academy, it was 
important to further explore its capabilities. 
2.5.3. Orange 
Orange data mining tool has been under development since 1996 at the 
Bioinformatics Laboratory at the Faculty of Computer and Information Science, 
University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. It has a canvas interface onto which it is possible to 
“place widgets and create a data analysis workflow” (Bennett, 2018). Figure 16 
represents Orange environment. 
 
Figure 16 - Orange environment. 
Widgets are considered as building blocks to create workflows and allow the user 
to do several functions like “reading the data, showing a data table, selecting features, 
training predictors, comparing learning algorithms, visualizing data elements” (Bennett, 
2018), among others. Data mining can be done in two different ways, through visual 
programming (using the drag and drop widgets) and through Python scripting. Widgets 
are divided into 5 main groups: Data, Visualize, Model, Evaluate and Unsupervised, 
being possible to add more groups through add-ons installation (Figure 17). The 
continuous development of this tool, combined with its user-friendly interface, highlights 
the need for further exploration. 
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Figure 17 - Orange main widget groups 
There are several studies that use one and sometimes more than one data mining 
tool to help to achieve a simple solution to the problem at hands.  
In fact, there can be found work of researchers that use these tools to try to 
achieve the same results as those resulting from field experts’ observations. With 
Orange, it was possible to build a predictive model that tries to estimate the probability 
that one tumor is organ confined (Zupan, 2001). This was applied to a problem of Urology 
and it mainly helped on the decision making by indicating the level of curability of the 
prostate cancer and which surgical techniques were the most appropriate. 
Also through Orange, it was possible to develop an automated system which aims 
to identify potentially illicit elephant ivory items being sold through the multinational e-
commerce corporation eBay (Hernandez-Castro, 2015).  
Table 3 summarises and presents additional information about the three data 
mining tools explored. 
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Table 3 - Summary table of the 3 data mining tools explored (Predictive Analytics Today, n.d.). 
Tools Characteristics Programming 
language 
Operating 
system 
Price/license 
RapidMiner 
Provides 
functionalities to 
optimize data 
exploration. Has an 
environment for 
data preparation, 
machine learning, 
among others. 
Java 
Python 
Windows 
macOS 
Linux 
Proprietary 
software 
WEKA 
Collection of 
machine learning 
algorithms for data 
mining tasks. 
Includes pre-
processing, 
classification, 
regression, among 
others. 
Java 
Windows 
macOS 
Linux 
Open Source 
software 
Orange 
Allows visualization 
and analysis of 
data. Data mining is 
done through visual 
programming or 
python scripting. 
Has components for 
machine learning, 
text mining, among 
others. 
Software core: 
C++ 
Extensions and 
query language: 
Python 
Windows 
macOS 
Linux 
Open Source 
software 
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3. Workflow and data processing 
3.1. Workflow 
Before starting the practical sections of this dissertation, it is important to 
delineate the steps that will be taken. Therefore, Figure 18 represents the steps of this 
research workflow. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18 - Steps of the research. 
Literature review was the first stage of this investigation, and it was necessary to 
introduce concepts that were fundamental in order to fully understand the following work. 
Data Collection consists in the process of gathering AIS and MONICAP data in 
their source format, going through all the bureaucratic issues related to data sharing. 
Data Processing will involve all the steps needed to convert data from its source 
format to the desired table format of PostgreSQL. 
The fourth stage of the process consists in the conduction of tests. This is a 
fundamental part of the workflow, where correlation between AIS and MONICAP will be 
tested as well as the detection of specific anomalies through the chosen data mining tool. 
The analysis of results is the fifth stage. The main goal of this step is to display 
the results obtained in the previous tests and analyze them in order to verify their 
integrity. 
1
• Literature Review
2
• Data Collection
3
• Data Processing
4
• Conduction of tests
5
• Analysis of results
6
• Conclusions
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On the last step, conclusions will be drawn from the analysis of results as well as 
from all previous work. 
3.2. Data collection 
“Data is the raw material of anomaly detection” (Martineau, 2011). Without data 
or of poor quality, all the work done afterwards can be compromised. This makes data 
collection the first step and one of the most important.  
As mentioned before, vessel traffic data, such as AIS and MONICAP, can be 
attained through Portuguese assets. 
Therefore, it is possible to have access to the AIS data in .mat format through 
Navy’s intranet link: ftp://ais-compiler/data.  
The MONICAP data, in .txt format, was also accessed through a Navy’s intranet 
link: \\PRD-MAP-APP1\CsmDataShare.  
The data collected concerns the period from January 2017 to December 2017, 
which corresponds to the most recent available data. 
Of special relevance is the fact that these sources of data have different 
transmission rates, with AIS data being clearly in advantage when compared with the 2 
hours’ rate of MONICAP data. 
3.3. Data Processing: AIS and MONICAP 
It is necessary to have a swift access to historical data and have it in a format 
that is easy to use in order to take full advantage of it. The main goal is to have all the 
data stored in the same format. PostgreSQL database was chosen to store all the AIS 
and MONICAP data. PostgreSQL is an open source object-relation database which is 
able to run on all major operating systems (PostgreSQL, n.d.).  
Through a spatial database extension for PostgreSQL, PostGIS, it is possible to 
run spatial queries in SQL, allowing additional data types: geography and geometry 
(PostGIS, n.d.). 
In order to store the data in PostgreSQL, it is necessary to complete a few steps 
before. Like it was mentioned above, AIS data comes in .mat format divided in daily files. 
The first step consisted in creating a simple MATLAB code (Appendix A) to have the data 
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files in .xlsx format19. It was necessary to tackle the fact that the date and time column 
was in MATLAB’s datenum20 format, as well as the fact that when data was converted to 
Excel it appeared in exponential form, thus losing precision. The end result is daily Excel 
files in the format shown in Figure 19:  
 
Figure 19 - Excel daily file. 
Due to Excel specifications and limits, namely in what concerns the total number 
of rows and columns in a worksheet (1,048,576 rows by 16,384 columns (Microsoft, 
n.d.)), it was necessary to convert the .xlsx files into another format, CSV. In order to do 
so, it was used a Java Script file converter, as it can be observed in Figure 20. 
                                               
19 Excel format is .xlsx. 
20 MATLAB’s datenum function creates a numeric array to represent date and time. 
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Figure 20 - Conversion from .xlsx files to .csv. 
In this new format, it was possible to aggregate the files into monthly .csv files 
using the command line presented in Figure 21. 
 
Figure 21 - Aggregation of the daily .csv files into monthly .csv files. 
Each AIS monthly file has an average of 11 million rows.  
Georeferencing data can be done directly in the database. However, there are 
other, simpler, ways to do it. For instance, by using ArcMap from ArcGIS, a Geographic 
Information System (GIS) developed by a company called Esri. ArcMap is “the primary 
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application used in ArcGIS for Desktop for mapping, editing, analysis, and data 
management” (ArcGIS, n.d.).  
By adding the .csv files as XY data and choosing the World Geodetic System 84 
(WGS84), which is the “reference coordinate system used by the Global Positioning 
System” (GISGeography, 2018), it is possible to save the data in shapefile 21 (.shp) 
format, as represented in Figure 22. According to Esri Shapefile Technical description, 
a shapefile “stores nontopological geometry and attribute information for the spatial 
features in a dataset” and the “geometry for a feature is stored as a shape comprising a 
set of vector coordinates” (Esri, 1997). 
However, even though ArcGIS stands out by its documentation on how to use its 
tools, it is, nonetheless, a proprietary software and its licence comes at a cost. For this 
reason, another software was used throughout this dissertation, QGIS. Through QGIS 
(which is an open-source cross-platform GIS), it is possible to create and add the 
shapefiles created as a vector layer, as it is presented in Figure 23. 
                                               
21  A shapefile is an Esri vector data storage format for storing the location, shape, and attributes of 
geographic features. It is stored as a set of related files and contains one feature class (ArcGIS, n.d.). 
Figure 22 - Shapefile created through ArcGIS. 
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Figure 23 - QGIS vector layer added. 
Granted that this step was done successfully, it is then possible to connect 
PostgreSQL database to QGIS and export that layer (Figure 24).   
Figure 24 – QGIS to PostgreSQL connection. 
Regarding the MONICAP data, the process is equal once the data is in .csv 
format. One can achieve that by using Power Query, an Excel add-in, to join the different 
.txt files into one month based .xlsx file. On average, a MONICAP monthly file has about 
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450 000 rows. Afterwards, the files are converted to .csv and the steps explained above 
are repeated.   
The database management interface pgAdmin was used to manage the 
database. 
Figure 25 shows the database in the pgAdmin interface. 
 
Figure 25 – Database in the pgAdmin interface. 
3.4. PostgreSQL Database 
There are several reasons that support the choice of PostgreSQL, besides being 
open source and available for all the most common operating systems as mentioned 
above. Behind a good documentation, in what concerns manuals, tutorials, books, 
among others, there is also a very active and collaborative community.  
Table 4 represents PostgreSQL processing capability. 
Table 4 - PostgreSQL processing capability (Database guide, n.d.). 
Limit Value 
Maximum Database Size Unlimited 
Maximum Table Size 32TB 
Maximum Row Size 1.6TB 
Maximum Field Size 1GB 
Maximum Rows per Table Unlimited 
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Maximum Columns per Table 250-1600 depending on column types 
Maximum Indexes per Table Unlimited 
 
 Another advantage of the usage of PostgreSQL is its advanced database 
management system, as it allows the access of several users at the same time. In 
addition, it is also possible to grant different roles for each user. This allows the database 
to follow the Atomicity, Consistency, Isolation, Durability (ACID) principles that every 
SQL database guarantee. (Essential SQL, n.d.). Atomicity is the principle where every 
operation is done as a single unit, which means that, for example, in a transaction moving 
two data sets, either all the information is saved or none. Consistency, on its turn, means 
that interrupted changes do not take place. Instead, the process is rolled back in order 
to keep data integrity. Isolation principle ensures that a certain transaction is not affected 
by any other transactions taking place. Finally, durability means that once a certain 
transaction is finished, it will remain so, even in the case of a system failure. 
The database is under the name “AIS_MONICAP_2017” and is composed by 
several tables, each one of them concerning a type of data and a month, as it can be 
seen in Figure 26. 
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Figure 26 - pgAdmin tables of AIS_MONICAP_2017 database. 
Inside each table, the data is organized as shown in Figure 27. 
One of the first steps was to normalize data in what concerns decimal places. 
The end result is 5 decimal places for latitude and longitude fields in both AIS and 
Figure 27 - Example of one of the AIS tables created. 
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MONICAP data. The field of SOG will have one decimal place, by reducing one decimal 
place of MONICAP data to match AIS’s field, and COG with 0, to match AIS data to 
MONICAP’s COG field. 
The normalizations of SOG and COG are quite easily explained by the 
irrelevance of 0,01 in terms of speed over ground or 0,1 in terms of course over ground. 
However, the latitude and longitude decimal places need a little further explaining.  
“Degrees of latitude are parallel so, for the most part, the distance between each 
degree remains constant” (Rosenberg, 2018). The same cannot be applied to longitude 
degrees, because their distance changes significantly, being farthest apart on top of the 
line of Equator and converging at the poles. 
In the Equator, 1º of latitude corresponds to 60 nautical miles22, and as mentioned 
above it almost does not vary from the Equator to the poles. As it is, 0,00001º of latitude 
means approximately 1,11 meters, which is a more than acceptable error in terms of 
positioning at sea. 
Regarding longitude, there is the need to perform a calculation based on the 
respective latitude. A simple and rough way to do this is by using the formula [1]. 
1º of Longitude = cosine (latitude in decimal degrees) * length of degree (miles) at 
equator [1] 
A degree of longitude is widest at the equator with a distance of 69.172 miles. 
Using [1], to the selected area (latitude 37,5ºN to 39,5ºN; longitude 010,5ºW to 
008,5ºW), 0,00001º of longitude means approximately between 1,016 meters and 0,989 
meters, which is also a satisfactory value.  
The main goal of the database is to gather and manage all the data required in 
order to identify anomalies, not only in the correlation between the different data types, 
but also anomalous values that the data may present. 
Once the database was concluded, a list of possible erroneous records was 
compiled so as to be looked upon and tagged. Therefore, the following possible 
erroneous records were listed:  
                                               
22 One nautical mile is equivalent to 1852 meters.  
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 Missing records, this means that no information has been received from 
the sensors; 
 Records with positions situated in anomalous places, for example 
onshore; 
 Records with SOGs extremely high, for example over than 100 knots; 
 Records with erroneous names, sometimes missing or partially cut. 
Once these records were identified, they were marked according to each type of 
error mentioned above. The decision to tag these records instead of simply removing 
them can be justified by the fact that what looks useless in most cases might be useful 
in the detection of anomalies in future studies (Urbano, 2014). In addition to that, 
sometimes repeated erroneous data can suggest a failure in the source, specifically in 
the sensors providing the data. Also, a record might have some erroneous values, but 
the remaining might still be useful and valid to be interpreted. 
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4. Data analysis tools 
4.1. Selected area 
In order to conduct some tests with the data, an area of interest was selected. 
This area comprises the data located between, in latitude 37,5º and 39,5ºN and in 
longitude, 10,5ºW and 8,5W, being represented in Figure 28. 
 
 
Figure 28 - Selected area (Daftlogic, n.d.). 
This area consists of about 8350 Nautical Square Miles (NM2) and it was chosen 
through the observation of vessel traffic density near the Portuguese Coast (Figure 29). 
The main ports comprised in the selected area are Lisbon and Sines. As it was 
mentioned before, during the introduction, the port of Lisbon stood out in 2017 for its 
development in terms of cargo movements. The port of Sines, on the other hand, is the 
port that detains the hegemony of cargo movements in Portugal. The choice of the size 
of the area was based on having an area large enough to have a comprehensive 
database without compromising the ability to store and process it.  
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Figure 29 - Traffic density in the chosen area (Marine Traffic, n.d.). 
 
4.2.  Data Mining for anomaly detection using Orange 
The data mining tool used in the present dissertation was Orange. The criteria 
was the fact that it is open source, its intuitive workflow and the active developing 
community, constantly updating and  delivering new functionalities.  
One of the main advantages of Orange is the ability to connect to a PostgreSQL 
database, as it is represented in Figure 30. In order to do so, it is necessary to install 
some extensions, more specifically psycopg2 and quantile. 
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Figure 30 - Orange connection to PostgreSQL database. 
With the SQL Table widget it is possible to introduce data from tables of the 
created database. However, one downside of the usage of this widget is the impossibility 
to use it with a very large table, which happens in “AIS_MONICAP_2017” database. In 
order to solve this issue two options were considered. One of them was to use the widget 
Data Sampler, which would randomly select a subset of data from the input dataset. The 
second option was to create smaller tables, with less data. Taking into consideration that 
the main goal was to analyze a certain area and data concerning specific ships, it was 
not viable to randomly select data. Therefore, smaller tables were created, with a week 
worth of data, within the selected area.  
For the initial trials, it was important to see if there was a simple way to correlate 
data from the two sources, AIS and MONICAP. The first tool used was the Distance 
Matrix. A distance matrix shows the distance between types of corresponding data in 
form of a table. The distances can be calculated through different methods such as 
Euclidean, Manhattan and Mahalanobis distance, among others, as shown in Figure 31. 
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Figure 31 - Distance calculation methods available in Orange. 
The second tool used for data correlation was the Impute widget. This widget has 
the goal of replacing missing values, by computing data according to several techniques 
or by data set by the user, as it is represented in Figure 32. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 32 - Orange's impute widget. 
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It is possible to specify general imputation techniques for every attribute or to 
specify individual treatment for each attribute. Of all these techniques, the only one that 
cannot be understood by its term is the Model-based imputer. This technique, by using 
the values of other attributes, creates a model for predicting the unknown values 
(Orange, n.d.). The default model is a 1-NN learner that replaces missing values with 
values from the most similar record. This model derives from a k-Nearest Neighbour (k-
NN) algorithm which is used for classification as well as regression-type prediction 
problems (Sharda, 2014). The k-NN method is one of the simplest of all machine-learning 
algorithms. For classification prediction, for example, a record is classified according to 
the class of its k nearest neighbours. According to the values of k, there can be different 
classifications. In Figure 33, the star in the centre is the target of this classification, being 
the squares and circles the possible classes. If k=1, the star would be considered a 
square. However, if k=3, the classification would be a circle and if k=5 it would be a 
square again. Figure 33 shows the importance of the k value.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 33 - Different classification based on k value (Sharda, 2014). 
In Orange’s impute case in particular, 1-NN, the record is classified with the class 
of its nearest neighbour. 
Outlier detection was another tool used during the experimental phase. Orange 
offers this widget with two different outlier detection methods: One class Support Vector 
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Machine (SVM) with non-linear kernel and Covariance estimator. While one class SVM 
with non-linear kernels works on non-Gaussian distributions, Covariance estimator is 
only used with Gaussian distributions. A Gaussian or normal distribution is a continuous 
probability distribution, represented by the mean (µ), the standard deviation (σ) and the 
variance (σ²).  This distribution can be observed in Figure 34. As the data used in this 
dissertation does not follow a Gaussian distribution, one class SVM with non-linear 
kernel was used instead (Orange, n.d.). 
 
Figure 34 - Example of Gaussian distribution (Boost, n.d.). 
Learning algorithms of data mining methods can be classified as supervised or 
unsupervised. Unsupervised learning is used when a model is trained without labelled 
data. On the other hand, supervised machine learning happens when labelled training 
data is available.  One class SVM with non-linear kernel is an unsupervised learning 
algorithm that classifies data as similar or different from the training set (Sharda, 2014). 
Using the Outliers widget in Orange (Figure 35), it is possible to define two 
parameters for the One class SVM with non-linear kernel method: Nu and Kernel 
coefficient. Nu parameter is an upper bound on the fraction of margin errors and a lower 
bound of the fraction of support vectors. Kernel coefficient is a gamma parameter, which 
determines the influence of a single data record. As this algorithm does not have an 
optimal set of parameters by default, it is necessary to experiment with these parameters 
in order to optimise the results obtained (Orange, n.d.).  
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Figure 35 - Orange's outlier widget. 
Data mining for anomaly detection in maritime traffic data 
 
57 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
TESTS AND RESULTS 
 
 
5.1 Data correlation tests and results 
5.2 Anomaly detection tests and results 
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5. Tests and Results 
5.1. Data correlation tests and results  
5.1.1. Test 1 
In the first test, AIS and MONICAP data that corresponded to a single ship’s route, 
Aurora, was used. This route concerns data from one day, 1st of March 2017. This first 
test uses a .csv file, rotas_correspondentes, with one vessel, having the complete AIS 
and MONICAP records from that day. 
As it was said before, Orange is quite simple to use. The first step is to insert the 
file with the data required through the file widget (Figure 36). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 36 - Data file insertion. 
Afterwards, it is necessary to select the features considered relevant to enter the 
distance matrix through the select columns widget. In this test, the features selected 
were minutes, latitude and longitude. These features can be selected in the select 
column widget, represented in Figure 37. With it, it is possible to select the features that 
will be used for the intended algorithm, so as the features that will be selected as targets 
and as meta attributes, which are features that, for the most cases, are not considered 
in the analysis (Orange, n.d.). 
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Figure 37 - Selection of features. 
Then, it is necessary to apply the distances widget and choose the type of 
distance wanted in the distance matrix. In this situation, Euclidean distance was the 
chosen method because, considering that the data is from a relatively small area, it could 
be compared to calculating distances in a two-dimensional plan (Figure 38). 
 
Figure 38 - Distance selected, Euclidean. 
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Only later it is possible to apply the distance matrix widget to the data, as it is 
represented in Figure 39. 
 
Figure 39 - Distance matrix application. 
Distance matrix results appear in a continuous color gradient ranging from a 
darker green, high values, to white, values equal or close to 0, as it can be observed in 
Figure 40. 
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Figure 40 – Example of colour gradient based on distances. 
AIS data goes from row 1 to 99, MONICAP data goes from row 100 to 141, in file 
rotas_correspondentes, all ordered in function of the time. 
From Figure 41, it is possible to see that there are big distances between the first 
points in AIS and the final ones, which makes sense because the ship is moving, from a 
point A to a Point B that are not the same, and consequently is altering its position. The 
time feature also contributes to the disparity of the values. 
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Figure 41 - Distance matrix results between AIS data. 
The biggest differences observed in this matrix (Figure 42) is when comparing 
the final AIS data with the first reports of MONICAP, which also makes sense considering 
that it is not a circular route. 
 
Figure 42 - Distance matrix results. 
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Because the file used is one that we can be assured that belongs to the same 
vessel, it is possible to select data (AIS and MONICAP) from a certain instance in time 
and see if the correspondent distance shows a small value (indexes are different 
because of the heading of the Excel file). It was selected data from almost the same time 
period, with only a minute of difference (Figure 43). 
 
 
Figure 43 - Values used to analyse results of distance matrix. 
The value obtained was 0.003, close to 0, as it is represented in Figure 44. 
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Figure 44 - Distance obtained from correlating AIS and MONICAP data. 
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Afterwards, the goal was to assess the impact that the time feature had on the 
results of the distance matrix. Therefore, it was selected two points with an 8 minute time 
difference (Figure 45). 
 
 
Figure 45 – Values used to analyze distance matrix with 8 minutes difference. 
The result was a 0.403, quite different from the previous result (Figure 46). 
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Figure 46 - Results obtained from correlating AIS and MONICAP data. 
5.1.2. Test 2 
In test 2, the data used is the same from the previous test. The difference is that 
time is not chosen as a feature, and therefore, it will not be considered in the 
computations (Figure 47). The results are then compared with the ones from test 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 47 - Orange scheme without time data. 
At first sight there are already differences (Figure 48). 
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Figure 48 - Distance matrix results without time data. 
With the 3 features, the overall distance is bigger than with only latitude and 
longitude but there is not a big discrepancy. The first MONICAP points start at 100 and 
in the matrix on the left the distances are very big because time didn’t correspond in the 
two different data (Figure 49). 
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Figure 49 - Distance matrix results for test 2. 
5.1.3. Test 3 
a) Latitude, Longitude and Time features 
The main goal was to identify a correspondence between single ship’s route with 
AIS and MONICAP data with 3 other ship’s route with only MONICAP data, all 
concerning one day of data (1st of March 2017) with latitude, longitude and time as 
features. Also, during test 3, the applicability of the Impute widget in this dataset was 
verified by confirming if it is possible to use it to replace missing values, and therefore to 
associate MMSIs from AIS data with names from MONICAP data. 
The file used throughout this test has four different MONICAP vessels and one 
AIS, existing one correspondence between one MMSI and one name. 
In this test, despite the distances regarding the corresponding MONICAP not 
being constant, it is only with the correspondent MONICAP data that the values get so 
close to 0. It is also possible to see that, in spite of a 5 minute difference between the 
points presented below, the distance is of 0.000 which makes sense by looking at the 
data (Figure 50) and seeing that the ship at that point has a SOG equal to 0. 
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Figure 50 - Distance matrix results in test 3. 
 Figure 51 represents a sample of the data used for this test. 
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Figure 51 - AIS and MONICAP data used on test 3. 
 For the Impute widget, latitude, longitude and time were selected as features, 
while name was selected as target, as it is the object of the imputation. Finally, the results 
obtained from the Impute widget proved to be successful, as the AIS vessel obtained the 
corresponding name after this process. This can be verified in Figure 52.   
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b) Latitude, longitude and COG features 
In this test, the file used was the same as on the previous one, but the features 
selected were latitude, longitude and COG. 
It turns out to be inconclusive, as data that should be corresponding (AIS: 46 to 
143; MONICAP: 144 to 186) appear with high values (Figure 53). In spite of this, the 
impute widget still presented correct results as it classified the AIS record with the right 
name.  
 
  
Figure 52 - Results after Impute widget. 
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Figure 53 - Distance matrix results in test 3 b). 
5.2. Anomaly Detection tests and results 
The second orange scenario consists in applying simple filters in order to detect 
anomalies, for example in terms of speed, and comparing those results with the ones 
obtained from the orange outlier widget. This scenario uses data from the created 
database, using the SQL widget in Orange. More specifically, it is connected to a table 
specially created for Orange tests, ais_monicap_mar. This table contains AIS and 
MONICAP data from the first week of March, as it reduced Orange’s processing time. In 
addition to that, a filter was applied in order to select a specific time for the analysis, in 
this case, from 0600 to 1200. 
This Orange workflow is represented in Figure 54, and it is essentially divided in 
three parts: detecting vessels with a SOG equal to zero, detecting vessels with 
anomalous SOGs and detecting vessels with anomalous SOGs or COGs in Cape Roca 
Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS)23. It also allows the analysis of a specific vessel that 
may have been detected as anomalous.  
 
                                               
23 A Traffic Separation Scheme has the main goal of regulating vessels traffic and ensuring navigational 
safety in congested waters.  
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The great advantage of this workflow is that it allows a common user, for example 
an operator, to change the parameters of what he wants to see without being required 
any special learning process. The results obtained in each part of the workflow can be 
represented in a data table, but also in a Geo Map widget. 
However, by using the SQL widget, it was not possible to select MMSI and name 
data as categorical type, as the type of data was automaticaly chosen from the 
PostgreSQL table. As a consequence, the impute widget did not present valid results, 
as it is possible to observe in Figure 55. This happens because MMSI can take any value 
by being numeric, which would not happen if this feature was set as categorical. 
Therefore, instead of doing a classification prediction type, it is doing a regression 
prediction, resulting in MMSI with continuous values and non-existing ones. As a 
consequence, this widget will not be used in the test. 
Figure 54 - Anomaly detection test Orange Workflow. 
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Figure 55 - Impute widget erroneous results. 
For the first segment of the workflow, an analysis is done based on the vessels’ 
SOG being equal to zero, as it is represented in Figure 56. It is also possible to analyze 
just one type of data (AIS or MONICAP), selecting it in the select data widget.  
 
 
Figure 56 - Branch of the workflow - Analysing records SOG = 0. 
 As one could expect, most of the records with SOG equal to zero represent 
moored vessels. However, using the Geo Map widget, it is possible to detect vessels 
with this speed at sea, which can be observed in Figure 57. This Figure represents every 
record that has SOG equal to zero, corresponding to a total of 3024 records on the 1st of 
March.  
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This factor would not be seen as an anomaly if it were not for the distance to the 
sea bed in those areas, which is far greater than what would be needed for anchoring. 
There is also the possibility of these being vessels engaged in fishing, which is not 
unlikely but requires further analysis. Therefore, the next step was to separate records 
that represented moored vessels from the ones that were at sea. In order to do so, the 
outlier widget was used, configured as it is represented in Figure 58, after parameters 
experimentation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 57 - Records with SOG = 0 on 1st of March, corresponding to a total of 3024 records. 
Figure 58 - Outlier widget configuration 
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With this widget, it was possible to separate the data, resulting in a total of 1810 
inliers and 1214 outliers. This is represented in Figure 59, where it is possible to observe 
the outliers on the left image and the inliers on the right image.  
Figure 59 - a) Outlier Records; b) Inlier Records. 
From the analysis of Figure 59, it is possible to say that most of the cases where 
the vessels were at sea were detected in the outliers segment. 
Once the records were detected, a second analysis may be done in order to verify 
if the pattern of movement corresponds to the type of vessel.  This analysis is done using 
the individual segment mentioned above.  
In Figure 60, it is represented one of the vessels chosen from the records shown 
on Figure 59, with a MMSI equal to 255125111. The colours represent different SOGs, 
being blue SOGs equal to zero and yellow a SOG being equal to nine. Consequently, it 
is possible to observe one moment where the SOG is equal to zero and another one 
where the SOG is above 8 knots, showing a pattern that is common with vessels 
engaged in fishing.  
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Figure 60 - Vessel with MMSI 255125111 route on 1st of March. 
The second branch of the workflow was the SOG outlier detection. In this branch, 
a simple outlier detection was created, in order to detect records with an anomalous 
SOG. This branch is represented in Figure 61. 
 
 The results are represented in Figure 62. However, due to the long range of 
SOGs, ranging from 0 to 102 (as it can be observed in the Figure’s legend), it is difficult 
to clarify other records with out of the ordinary SOGs. From these results, it was possible 
to detect several records with SOGs of 102 knots.  
Figure 61 - SOG Outlier detection. 
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Figure 62 - Results of SOG outlier detection. 
 Considering that these records are related to vessels, it is highly unlikely that this 
speed is correct.  Upon further research, 102 knots revealed to be the maximum value 
AIS transponder transmits (Marine Traffic, n.d.). Therefore, it may be concluded that this 
information results from a system or transmission error. 
In order to detect anomalous speeds without system errors, a filter was done, so 
as to remove speeds over 100 knots. The results are represented in Figure 63. 
Figure 63 - SOG outlier detection after filtering. 
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The blue dots represent records with a SOG equal or very close to 0 knots. Upon 
further analysis, all the records were identified as fishing vessels, as this filter may be 
indicated to identify this type of ships. 
 The next branch of this workflow was the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) 
anomaly detection. This branch is represented in Figure 64. 
 
For this branch, four features were selected in order to be used in the outliers 
widget, as it is represented in Figures 65 and 66. The reason these features were 
selected was to find anomalous records in the TSS, based on an abnormal SOG or COG 
values in accordance with the vessels’ position. A total of 200 outliers were detected in 
this branch. 
 
 
Figure 64 - Traffic separation scheme branch. 
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Figure 65 - Features selection for traffic separation scheme. 
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Figure 66 - Outlier widget for traffic separation scheme. 
In this branch, only data from the TSS of Cape Roca is selected. This TSS is 
represented in Figure 67. 
 
According to the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, there 
are several rules concerning TSSs (International Rules for Preventing Colisions at Sea, 
Figure 67 - TSS of Cape Roca. 
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1972). Therefore, from rule 10 “Traffic separation schemes”, which is presented in Annex 
B, vessels should “avoid crossing traffic lanes, but if obliged to do so shall cross on a 
heading as nearly as practicable at right angles to the general direction of traffic flow” 
(Figure 68). 
 
The results for this branch are presented in Figure 69 a) and b). 
 
Figure 68 - Crossing a traffic lanes according to International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at 
Sea. 
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Figure 69 - Traffic separation scheme, a) Every record; b) Outlier records. 
The results present two possible anomalous cases, as it is observed in Figure 70.  
In case 1, it is possible to observe a set of records that belong to the same vessel. 
As it is represented in Figure 70, this vessel is crossing the traffic lanes without doing it 
at as close as to the normal direction (perpendicular) to the general direction of traffic 
flow, as it was mentioned above. This practice is not in accordance with the International 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. 
Figure 70 - TSS anomalous records. 
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On the other hand, in case 2, it is possible to observe two vessels, one in each 
traffic lane, which according to their positions seem normal. However, their COGs 
represent abnormal values considering their future positions, as the record from the left 
corridor has a COG of approximately 265 and the record from the right, a COG of 090. 
This may mean a system anomaly, as these COG values do not correspond to the ones 
that are indicated for the vessels to go from one position to the other in that amount of 
time. The COG values for the left traffic lane should be approximately 180 and for the 
right traffic lane around 000. 
On table 5, it is possible to observe a summary of the Anomaly Detection 
conducted tests using PostgreSQL database and Orange Data Mining tool.  
Table 5 - Summary of the conducted tests. 
Tests Anomaly Features 
used 
Techniques used Results 
1 
Ships with 
SOGs=0 
not moored 
Latitude and 
longitude 
One class SVM 
with non-linear 
kernel through 
Outlier widget 
The majority of moored 
vessels were 
separated. The outliers 
may be vessels 
engaged in fishing. 
2 
Anomalous 
SOG 
Latitude, 
longitude and 
SOG 
One class SVM 
with non-linear 
kernel through 
Outlier widget 
Detected anomalous 
SOGs of 102 knots, 
which may indicate a 
system or transmission 
anomaly. 
3 
Anomalous 
SOGs or 
COGs in 
TSS 
Latitude, 
longitude, 
SOG and 
COG 
One class SVM 
with non-linear 
kernel through 
Outlier widget 
Detected anomalous 
COGs in the TSS and 
system or transmission 
anomalies 
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6. Conclusion 
6.1.   Summary 
This dissertation aims to maximize maritime situational awareness by detecting 
anomalies in maritime traffic data. The need to have a good maritime situational 
awareness has been recognized as highly important by every coastal country, more so 
in a country like Portugal, which has an immense EEZ. 
In the first chapter of this dissertation, the topic of this dissertation was introduced. 
On this chapter it is possible to understand the underlining motivation and relevance of 
this topic, as well as its main goals. 
On Chapter two, a literature review has been done, focusing on maritime 
situational awareness on the first sub-chapter, moving on to the concept of anomaly and 
anomaly detection. This chapter ends with a brief review of several data mining tools. 
On the third Chapter, the investigation workflow was introduced, as well as an 
explanation about the origin of the data used in this dissertation and all the steps done 
in order to include the data in a PostgreSQL database.  
On Chapter four, an area of interest was defined and the data mining tool that 
would be used to analyze the data, as well as the specific functions used in this 
dissertation.  
On the last chapter before conclusions, “Tests and results” the results obtained 
by using Orange Data Mining Tool are represented. It was on this chapter that it was 
possible to observe that correlation between data sources can be done through Orange, 
as well as Outlier Detection in a traffic separation scheme, and other cases with 
anomalous SOGs and COGs.  
A good recognized maritime picture is maintained by using data from different 
sources. If it is possible to correlate data from different sources, not only is the problem 
of the overwhelming amount of data somewhat solved, but it allows the detection of 
different type of anomalies. 
Therefore, the goals of this dissertation were for the most part achieved. The 
results provided by Orange Data Mining turned out to be satisfactory, as it was possible 
to obtain relevant results, through the detection of anomalies in a simple and easy way, 
as this tool is very user-friendly. These results proved to be even more satisfactory, as 
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Orange is in constant development by the community, having a tremendous potential 
that can be explored even further. 
The MARISA project proved to be pertinent, as it contributed for the initial 
identification of requisites and definition of anomalies, demonstrating to be an influence 
for this dissertation. 
6.2. Constraints 
During this dissertation there were some constraints that made it difficult to carry 
out this research.  
The first was the difficulty on obtaining data. The data presented in this 
dissertation was obtained belatedly, mostly due to bureaucracies, that considering the 
type of data, and the entities that possess them, are totally understandable. However, 
taking into consideration the time available for this master thesis, it was a serious 
limitation. Therefore, a great amount of the available time for the dissertation was used 
to obtain data and creating the database. 
The second one, was the resources available for executing this dissertation. The 
main factor for this was the lack of a computer that could process the immense amount 
of data for PostgreSQL database and for Orange analysis. This constraint resulted on 
the usage of a personal computer, without the ideal processing capabilities that would 
be desired. As a consequence, the data sets analyzed on Orange had to be, for the most 
part, reduced. 
6.3. Future work 
 There are several projects that can be done as future work: 
 Since the database is already created, it is suggested the addition of 
meteorological and oceanographic data, and its integration on the 
analysis; 
 The combination of SADAP with Orange is also proposed considering that 
through SADAP it is possible to evaluate the probability of finding vessels 
performing infractions. This first assessment would allow to focus 
Orange’s analysis to those specific geographical areas and time periods 
and judge if the results obtained can identify the reported transgressions. 
It would also allow a more detailed individual analysis of vessels by 
showing any existing past infractions; 
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 Orange data mining tool’s constant development makes it very important 
to continue to explore it and its add-ons, such as tools for text analysis 
from social networks or journals; 
 As all the data in the PostgreSQL database is georeferenced, another 
suggestion would be to explore the variety of spatial operations that 
PostGIS has to offer. 
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Appendix A 
Matlab code to convert data to .xlsx format: 
%PASSAR DADOS AIS DE *MAT PARA EXCEL 
  
% Dia 1 
load('E:\DADOS AIS\2017\10\F\F01Oct2017.mat'); 
c=length(footprint_aom); 
d=cell(c,11); % cria um conjunto de células (tem que ser células e não 
matrizes, por serem dados do tipo string) 
for ir=1:c 
    a=footprint_aom(ir,1); 
    e=footprint_aom(ir,2); 
    b=sprintf('%.0f',a); % passar MMSI p string / '%.0f' significa que 
não vai ter nenhuma casa decimal 
    f=datestr(e,'dd/mm/yyyy HH:MM'); % converter o datenum no formato 
indicado 
    d{ir,1}=b; 
    d{ir,2}=f(1:2);%dia 
    d{ir,3}=f(4:5);%mes 
    d{ir,4}=f(7:10);%ano 
    h=str2num(f(12:13));%horas 
    m=str2num(f(15:16));%minutos 
    min = (h*60) + m ; 
    d{ir,5}=min; 
    d{ir,6}=footprint_aom(ir,3); 
    d{ir,7}=footprint_aom(ir,4); 
    d{ir,8}=footprint_aom(ir,5); 
    d{ir,9}=footprint_aom(ir,6); 
    d{ir,10}=footprint_aom(ir,7); 
    d{ir,11}=footprint_aom(ir,8); 
end 
  
% passar dados para formato xlsx (excel) 
xlswrite('AIS_01Oct.xlsx',d); 
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Annex A – International Requirements for AIS Carriage 
According to Chapter V, Regulation 19.2.4 of SOLAS Convention: 
“2.4. All ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards engaged on international voyages and 
cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards not engaged on international voyages 
and passenger ships irrespective of size shall be fitted with an automatic identification 
system (AIS), as follows:  
2.4.1. Ships constructed on or after 1 July 2002;  
2.4.2. Ships engaged on international voyages constructed before 1 July 2002:  
2.4.2.1. in the case of passenger ships, not later than 1 July 2003;  
2.4.2.2. in the case of tankers, not later than the first survey for safety equipment* 
on or after 1 July 2003; 
* Refer to regulation I/8  
2.4.2.3. in the case of ships, other than passenger ships and tankers, of 50,000 
gross tonnage and upwards, not later than 1 July 2004;  
2.4.2.4. in the case of ships, other than passenger ships and tankers, of 300 gross 
tonnage and upwards but less than 50,000 gross tonnage, not later than the first safety 
survey after 1 July 2004 or by 31 December 2004, whichever occurs earlier; and  
2.4.3. ships not engaged on international voyages constructed before 1 July 2002, not 
later than 1 July 2008;  
2.4.4. the Administration may exempt ships from the application of the requirements of 
this paragraph when such ships will be taken permanently out of service within two years 
after the implementation date specified in subparagraphs .2 and .3”. 
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Annex B - Rule 10: Traffic Separation Schemes 
According to the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea – 
Rule 10: 
(a) This Rule applies to traffic separation schemes adopted by the Organization and does 
not relieve any vessel of her obligation under any other rule.   
(b) A vessel using a traffic separation scheme shall:   
(i) proceed in the appropriate traffic lane in the general direction of traffic flow for 
that lane;   
(ii) so far as practicable keep clear of a traffic separation line or separation zone;   
(iii) normally join or leave a traffic lane at the termination of the lane, but when 
joining or leaving from either side shall do so at as small an angle to the general direction 
of traffic flow as practicable.   
(c) A vessel shall, so far as practicable, avoid crossing traffic lanes but if obliged to do 
so shall cross on a heading as nearly as practicable at right angles to the general 
direction of traffic flow.   
(d) 
(i) A vessel shall not use an inshore traffic zone when she can safely use the 
appropriate traffic lane within the adjacent traffic separation scheme. However, vessels 
of less than 20 metres in length, sailing vessels and vessels engaged in fishing may use 
the inshore traffic zone.   
(ii) Notwithstanding subparagraph (d)(i), a vessel may use an inshore traffic zone 
when en route to or from a port, offshore installation or structure, pilot station or any other 
place situated within the inshore traffic zone, or to avoid immediate danger.   
(e) A vessel other than a crossing vessel or a vessel joining or leaving a lane shall not 
normally enter a separation zone or cross a separation line except:   
(i) in cases of emergency to avoid immediate danger;   
(ii) to engage in fishing within a separation zone.   
(f) A vessel navigating in areas near the terminations of traffic separation schemes shall 
do so with particular caution.   
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(g) A vessel shall so far as practicable avoid anchoring in a traffic separation scheme or 
in areas near its terminations.   
(h) A vessel not using a traffic separation scheme shall avoid it by as wide a margin as 
is practicable.   
(i) A vessel engaged in fishing shall not impede the passage of any vessel following a 
traffic lane.   
(j) A vessel of less than 20 metres in length or a sailing vessel shall not impede the safe 
passage of a power-driven vessel following a traffic lane.   
(k) A vessel restricted in her ability to manoeuvre when engaged in an operation for the 
maintenance of safety of navigation in a traffic separation scheme is exempted from 
complying with this Rule to the extent necessary to carry out the operation.   
(l) A vessel restricted in her ability to manoeuvre when engaged in an operation for the 
laying, servicing or picking up of a submarine cable, within a traffic separation scheme, 
is exempted from complying with this Rule to the extent. 
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